Los Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE son una herramienta para fomentar la discusión entre las comunidades académicas. A partir de la difusión, en este formato, de los avances de investigación se busca que los autores puedan recibir comentarios y retroalimentación de sus pares nacionales e internacionales en un estado aún temprano de la investigación.
Resumen ¿Cómo dan forma las regulaciones públicas al comportamiento de las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONGs)? Las ONGs que operan en los países del Sur Global y los antiguos países communistas dependen en alto grado del financiamiento internacional. Muchas de estas ONGs desafían el statu quo político por la defensa de las causas liberales como los derechos humanos, la democracia, las reformas electorales y la igualdad de género. La dependencia del financimiento extranjero; sin embargo, parcialmente desconecta estos grupos de intereses locales y el público, y ha facilitado la proliferación de "maletínes", o falsas ONGs. Percibiendo una oportunidad política, los Estados han comenzado a promulgar leyes que restringen el acceso de las ONG locales al financimiento extranjero, imponen requisitos de presentación de informes onerosos, y de otra manera limitan sus actividades. Examinamos esta tendencia en el contexto de Etiopía, donde la legislación promulgada en 2010 ha impedido ONGs locales de capital extranjero de trabajar en temas políticamente sensibles. Encontramos que la mayoría de las "ONGs de maletín" y la mayoría de los ONGs locales de derechos en Etiopía han desaparecido. Sobrevivientes de las ONGs han
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Introduction
How do public regulations influence the behavior and survival of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)? Prior research emphasizes the nongovernmental dimensions of civil society, implicitly assuming that NGOs are largely insulated from states (Wapner, 1995) . In reality, however, states powerfully shape patterns of NGO emergence, activity, and survival, similar to states' influence over other non-state actors such as firms. States establish NGOs' institutional context through public regulations, determining the types of NGOs that may survive and prosper -their "population ecology" in short (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) . States' regulatory impact is increasingly visible as governments from India to Israel discuss and promulgate tougher laws to reclaim symbolic and political ground lost to local and international NGOs in the past decades. States are helped in this by the fact that many local NGOs in the global South depend on Western and international funding, which tends to disconnect them from local concerns and allows their opponents to portray them as foreign agents. Foreign funding has also facilitated the proliferation of "briefcase NGOs," (Hearn, 2007) further undermining NGOs' legitimacy. Local NGO dependence on foreign funding, in other words, has created the political opportunity for states to strike back.
We explore new regulatory restrictions on NGOs in the context of Ethiopia, a major recipient of international aid that recently banned overseas funding to local NGOs working on politically sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy, elections, and ethnic relations. Employing the organization ecology literature, we generate theoretical propositions about NGO survival and strategies based on NGOs' need for foreign resources, the sensitivity of their work, and the complexity of their program portfolio. Our Ethiopian "plausibility probe" (Eckstein, 1975) suggests that the country's newly enacted Charities and Societies Proclamation, which was proposed in 2009 and implemented in 2010, has dramatically re-shaped its NGO sector. Most notably, it cut the number of local "briefcase," or sham NGOs, along with most foreign-aid-dependent human rights groups. Surviving NGOs have successfully "rebranded" their activities by abandoning an explicit interest in human rights, or have restructured their operations by focusing on less sensitive domains. International NGOs (INGOs) experienced little mortality, but to survive, they too rebranded their human rights work or restructured their activities so as to stop supporting politically sensitive projects.
To examine the Ethiopian case and its broader implications, we proceed as follows. Section 1 explores the debates in the NGO literature, especially in terms of how states and NGOs relate to each other. Section 2 examines the growing anti-NGO global backlash and Ethiopia's 2009 Proclamation. Section 3 outlines our testable propositions, Section 4 presents methods and data, and variety of attendant pathologies (Barr, Fafchamps and Owens, 2005; Bob, 2005; Carpenter, 2007; Cooley and Ron, 2002; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Hearn, 2007) ; deepened inequalities between NGO workers and the rest of the population (Uvin, 1998) , or between internationally connected NGOs and those with fewer connections (Barr, Fafchamps and Owens, 2005; Stiles, 2002) ; and have given local NGOs insufficient incentive to vigorously represent local concerns, and to raise local funding (Chandhoke, 2002; Townsend, Porter, and Mawdsley, 2002) . Other voices argue that local NGOs are insufficiently transparent (Barr, Fafchamps and Owens, 2005; Burger and Owens, 2010) ; self-aggrandizing (Englund, 2006; Petras, 1999; Uvin, 1998) ; and a threat to popular social movements (Hammami, 1995; Manji and O'Coill, 2002; Petras, 1999; Stiles, 2002) , or to local charitable efforts (Fafchamps and Owens, 2009) .
Both optimists and skeptics, however, have under-estimated states' continuing power and influence over NGOs. Whereas the optimists have overstated the state's decline vis-à-vis NGOs, the skeptics have focused too narrowly on the negative effects of international ideas and money. This article, by contrast, brings the state back in, arguing that states both mediate transnational flows (Krasner, 1995) and shape NGOs' institutional environments. They enact and enforce the rules under which NGOs emerge, operate, use resources, and survive; they govern NGOs' physical access to territories and populations; and they grant NGOs permission to operate in specific issue areas (Bloodgood, 2010; Bratton, 1989; Jalali, 2008; Henderson, 2011) . High capacity states will likely have the most regulatory impact on NGOs, but even the feeblest of government agencies can disrupt NGOs' operations. Thus while NGOs may be legally nongovernmental, they are in no way "beyond" the state (Wapner 1995) .
The Global Backlash
The capacity and desire of states to regulate NGOs has become increasingly apparent, with at least 90 states restricting civil society in one form or another over the last few years. 1 The trend is evident both in less democratic countries such as China and Russia, as well as in functioning democracies such as Canada, India, and Israel. 2 In Africa alone, according to our research, 24 of 54 states have, since 1995, enacted new, more restrictive regulations or reinforced existing legislation regarding the activities of international NGOs 1 See Edwards, 2009; Howell et al, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2010; International Center for Non-Profit Law, 2009; Mayhew, 2005; Moyo, 2010; Tiwana and Belay, 2010 and/or on the flow of foreign money to local NGOs (see Appendix 1).
3 This trend towards the adoption of more restrictive NGO legislation stands in stark contrast to the efforts during the late 1980s and 1990s by international donors, such as the World Bank, to pressure states to adopt more liberal NGO laws (Reimann 2006; Beckmann 1991; Cernea 1988) .
Recent Ethiopian events exemplify the global trend of states seeking to reclaim political space lost to local and international NGOs in recent decades. They also exemplify states' growing efforts to reinforce, and create new, forms of border controls in an era of accelerated transnational flows (Andreas, 2001) . State leaders appreciate the symbolic and political threat posed by the "boomerang politics" of local/transnational NGO coalitions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) , and seek to disrupt those links as best they can. Local NGOs' lack of local rootedness -itself due in part to their dependence on foreign aid -has given states both the motive and the opportunity to move against these groups.
In January 2009, the Ethiopian government passed the "Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies" in response to the opposition's political successes in the 2005 national elections, and to postelection disputes -some of which turned violent -over the outcome. The government suppressed the protests and accused local and international civil society of fanning the flames (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009 The ruling Ethiopian Revolutionary Popular Democratic Front (ERPDF) says that it is one of the country's only selfless actors, arguing that it alone can deliver the economic growth necessary for democracy (Rahmato, 2002& 2010 . 5 The ERPDF distinguishes its activities from those of officials in "rentier states" who abuse their government positions for personal gain. The party also criticizes local NGOs, many of whom it regards as cynical rent-seekers using foreign money for inflated salaries and unnecessary expenses. Echoing the work of scholarly NGO skeptics, the ERPDF claims that local NGOs often lack popular support, promote international rather than local agendas, and are otherwise inauthentic, undemocratic, unaccountable, or locally 3 In August 2012, we collected data on all laws passed in Africa since 1995 regarding both the operations of foreign NGOs and foreign funding flows to domestic NGOs. Since 1995, 21 of 54 countries have passed more restrictive legislation regarding foreign funding and/or foreign NGO operations, while three countries reinforced existing restrictions in updated legislation. Additionally, Egypt and Libya are currently considering draft legislation that would severely hamper the activities of foreign NGOs as well as foreign funding flows to local NGOs. Only one African country, Morocco, has passed less restrictive legislation since 1995. 4 These claims likely stemmed from the support offered to opposition parties by the Ethiopian diaspora (see Lyons, 2007) , along with election monitoring, voter education, and human rights reporting by local, foreign-funded groups. 5 Although Ethiopia is one of Africa's top economic performers, its political system lags on most indicators of democratic governance.
illegitimate. 6 Only civil society groups established, controlled, and funded by Ethiopians, the ERPDF says, should work on advancing Ethiopian political and human rights (CCRDA, 2011a; Hailegebriel, 2010 As of 2010, when the Proclamation came into effect, Type 1 NGOs are the only groups permitted to work on politically sensitive issues, including human rights, democracy, national equality, nationalities, gender, religion, the rights of children and the disabled, conflict resolution and reconciliation, justice and law enforcement, and elections and democratization. When these Type 1 NGOs re-registered in 2010, they were prohibited from having more than 50,000 Birr (approximately $2900), depriving them of previously acquired resources. The Proclamation also specifies that NGOs in all three categories may not spend over 30% of their budget on administration; cannot receive anonymous donations; and must register every three years with the official Charities and Societies Agency (CSA). Finally, all NGOs must establish legal personality, submit yearly financial audits and budget reports, and provide the CSA with advance notice of general assembly meetings.
The Proclamation's implications were clear. By 2010, NGOs hoping to continue their work on human rights and other sensitive issues would have to rid themselves of foreign backers and savings. The Ethiopian state had adopted an "NGO import substitution model" (Henderson, 2011) , driving a wedge between foreign groups and monies, on the one hand, and domestic NGOs and political activities, on the other. And while the ERPDF may have drawn on the insights of skeptical NGO scholars, its policy solutions were far 6 A ruling party (ERPDF) document from 2006 outlines the government's view of NGOs: "NGOs are not organizations established by citizens to protect their rights. These organizations are rather established by individuals mainly for personal benefit, accountable to, and advancing the interests of foreign agencies. Their leaders are not accountable to the staff of the organizations and the beneficiaries. As result, they cannot have a democratic nature and role.… Therefore, the government has to confront the rent seeking nature of NGOs, for example, by considering those organizations receiving 15% of their income from foreign sources as foreign organizations and denying them recognition as a means of expression of freedom of association as well as democratic forums." Quoted in Hailegebriel, 2010, p. 20. 7 The Proclamation does not apply to religious organizations, cultural associations, organizations governed by other laws, or organizations operating in only one region of the country. more drastic than anything most of those critics would recommend. The ERPDF's intentions, moreover, were likely aimed at shutting down opposition altogether, rather than at creating a more vibrant, locally rooted civil society.
Testable Propositions
The organizational ecology literature suggests that institutional environments shape the composition and size of organizational populations by imposing permissible patterns of resource availability, mobilization, and use (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; McCarthy and Wolfson, 1996; Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) . When states create new rules to reduce inflows of critical resources and to proscribe activities, the size and composition of the NGO sector can be expected to change. Furthermore, surviving NGOs can be expected to adopt new ways of functioning that cohere with the changed institutional environment (Aldrich, 2008) . Specifically, we expect restrictions on foreign funding to lead to high mortality among local "briefcase" NGOs, as well as among local, foreign-aid dependent groups working in the newly proscribed areas. In contrast, NGOs working on permitted issues, multiple issues (some of which are in the prohibited category), and INGOs should all prove comparatively resilient following the state's regulatory crackdown. We explore the logic of these claims below.
Briefcase NGOs emerge and proliferate in environments marked by plentiful donor funding, low barriers to NGO entry, and weak state oversight (Hearn, 2007) . In Uganda, for example, surveyors discovered that 75% of government-registered groups in Kampala existed only on paper (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owen, 2004) . When states enhance oversight and demand more audits and information, we expect most briefcase groups to disappear, even if generous donor funds still exist. Briefcase operators are unlikely to run the risk of penalty, and should also be scared off by the regulations' new and more onerous requirements. The likely exception to this is briefcase NGOs created by persons close to the regime, especially in contexts where political patronage trumps the rule of law.
Local NGOs working on proscribed issues are also likely to be intensely vulnerable to a regulatory crack-down, especially if they are dependent on foreign aid. In particular, the survival of local NGOs concerned with promoting human rights -which is often a state-proscribed area -will be at risk. Recent scholarship suggests that this sector tends to be highly dependent on foreign aid, due in large part to growing donor interest in human rights promotion and the subsequent "rights-based" turn in international development policy (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Kindornay, Ron and Carpenter, 2012; Nelson and Dorsey, 2003; Uvin, 2004) . Country studies have found high dependency rates among rights NGOs in Israel (Berkovitch and Gordon, 2008) , Malawi (Englund, 2006) , and Nigeria (Okafor, 2006) . For reasons explored below, vulnerability to new regulations is enhanced when NGO programs are wholly focused on proscribed issues (a characteristic of single issue-groups), rather than on a wide range of program areas, including both proscribed and non-proscribed topics (characteristic of multiple-issue groups). NGOs that combine development with human rights (via the "rights-based approach to development") are likely to have a higher survival rate, especially if they already have an established reputation in a development subfield.
International NGOs (INGOs) are likely to prove resilient when they combine advocacy and other programs in proscribed issue areas with service delivery in non-proscribed areas. Even the most anti-NGO of governments should be loath to lose INGO services, while INGOs themselves are often motivated to remain in Southern countries, even under difficult political conditions (Bob, 2005; Cooley and Ron, 2002; Hertel, 2006) . The INGO mission typically involves providing succor to the needy -the number of which is likely to increase during periods of repression -and bearing witness to abuse. More cynically, perhaps, INGOs depend on Southern access for funding, status and credibility (Bob, 2005 ). An INGO with no Southern foothold will struggle to raise money back home, appear relevant to important Northern audiences, or otherwise thrive. INGOs who engage both in proscribed and non-proscribed activities have broad issue portfolios, allowing them to engage more readily in the following survival strategies. In contrast, INGOs that work specifically in proscribed issue areas, such as local chapters of Amnesty International, are unlikely to survive a regulatory shift.
Survival strategies
The organization ecology literature expects groups to respond to regulatory change by minimizing, avoiding, or trying to defeat the new rules (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009) . Survival strategies can involve internal organization transformation, external institutional transformation, or a mix of both. These include complying with some or all of the new rules; delaying or sequencing compliance; co-opting the constraint's source, or trying to alter its nature; evading scrutiny; altering the organization's internal structure; or merging with other organizations less affected by the rules. Organizations, in other words, can fly under the radar and try to evade the new rules; roll back the new rules through media work, political advocacy, and other forms of lobbying; or they can somehow change their own organizations. Organizations differ in their willingness and capacity to adopt these strategies, however.
(a) Internally-focused survival strategies
As noted above, complex, multiple-issue NGOs working in several issue areas, including both proscribed (such as human rights) and permitted topics, (such as development), should prove more resilient than single-issue groups. This is because multiple-issue groups can engage more easily in two key survival strategies: rebranding and restructuring.
The least costly NGO strategy is the rebranding of newly stigmatized activities as something less threatening. Restructuring, by contrast, involves real organizational change, including cutting newly prohibited work and partners, and re-allocating those resources to other, less contentious areas. Both strategies are likely to be easier for multiple-issue NGOs, since singleissue groups have no activities in other domains to use as rhetorical cover when rebranding, or to re-focus on when restructuring. As a result, we expect multiple-issue NGOs to be more resilient than single-issue groups.
(b) Externally focused survival strategies
NGOs may also try to alter their political and institutional environment by seeking to roll back the new rules. One method of doing this is mobilizing assistance from international donors, allies, and the media. This "boomerang" strategy (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) involves the naming and shaming efforts that INGOs are justly famous for (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Krain, 2012; Murdie and Davis, 2012; Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005) . Given that the international media is likely to regard tough new restrictions on foreign aid as particularly newsworthy (Ramos, Ron and Thoms, 2007) , both INGO and local NGO lobbying are likely to attract transnational media attention. The boomerang's actual policy success, however, depends on the balance of domestic and international forces. After all, even the strongest of boomerangs do not always work as intended.
Transnational boomerangs tend to be more successful when local activists enjoy broad local support, especially when that support is articulated through mass but peaceful demonstrations (Bob, 2005) . Local mobilization can boost local NGOs' credibility with INGOs and other international audiences, and allows INGOs to portray their advocacy on behalf of the threatened local activists as a response to a genuine, peaceful, and democratically articulated local demand. Unless local NGOs enjoy a long history of successful local constituency building, however, we do not expect much success on this count. NGOs dependent on foreign funds may be good at mobilizing their international allies and media, but are likely to have a harder time mobilizing local supporters.
Finally, local NGOs may try to alter their resource environment by replacing foreign monies with local revenue. Like mass constituency building, however, local fund raising takes time, skill, and effort, all of which are likely in short supply following a government crackdown. Groups dependent on foreign aid, moreover, are not likely to have built up the necessary local fund raising contacts, skills and resources, given that the easy availability of foreign aid provides NGOs with few incentives to mobilize lower-yielding local resources.
To summarize, we expect new, state-imposed restrictions on NGO registration, on foreign funding flows to local NGOs, and on politically sensitive activities to have the following effects:
Proposition 1: "Briefcase" NGOs in all domains will experience high mortality.
Proposition 2: Local NGOs focused on proscribed domains, especially human rights, and dependent on foreign resources, will experience high mortality, especially when they have single rather than multiple issue portfolios.
Proposition 3: INGOs will experience low mortality.
Proposition 4: Surviving NGOs will tend to have rebranded or restructured their activities.
Data & Methods
We focus on recent events in Ethiopia for several reasons. First, Ethiopian conditions are representative of global civil society trends. A large number of countries have begun restricting foreign inflows to domestic NGOs, or imposed new constraints on INGOs working locally. This trend is particularly evident in Africa; as noted above, 24 of 54 African countries have passed restrictions of this sort since 1995. Indeed, Ethiopia's 2009 Proclamation resembles other countries' laws, both African and otherwise, especially in its restrictions on human rights work. Rulers have imposed comparable restrictions in Egypt, Algeria, Eritrea, Somaliland, and Russia, among others.
Second, Ethiopia offers a unique opportunity to study the effect of regulatory shifts on NGO population ecology in real time; the Proclamation's 2010 implementation, and our summer 2011 research, allowed us to swiftly track temporal and policy change, while holding both place and national culture constant (Gerring and McDermott, 2007) . Nevertheless, we recognize that the immediacy of Ethiopian events also imposes research limitations; a rigorous test of our claims requires representative samples of the country's NGO population, observed over a longer period of time. Comprehensive sampling is neither feasible nor ethical at this moment, however, given government repression, government and NGO anxieties, and politicization of civil society-related issues. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any country where the comprehensive collection of NGO data would be both ethical and feasible so soon after a major state crackdown. To study the effects of regulatory change in real time, we adopted less obtrusive strategies.
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To do this, we launched a "plausibility probe" (Eckstein, 1975) , beginning with theoretically generated hypotheses, and then continuing with preliminary data collection to evaluate whether the theory is reasonable, and whether further research is warranted. To do this, our lead author traveled to Ethiopia in summer 2011 for two weeks of low-profile fieldwork, including 27 private and semi-structured key informant interviews. She also collected pertinent documents with limited international availability, and spoke with international advocacy organizations via telephone. (See Appendix 2 for details.)
We identified informants through background research on the Proclamation, as well as through contacts established in Ethiopia when politicians were debating the new rules. We made subsequent contacts through "snowball sampling" (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981-82) , initiating six different referral chains that produced 17 informants, who then identified our ten remaining informants as especially knowledgeable individuals.
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Given the political sensitivities, we chose an experienced field researcher with an Ethiopian track record. She ensured beforehand that the proposed research was not overly risky, exercised discretion in the field, and orally obtained consent from participants, making clear they could withdraw from the interview at any time.
9 To safeguard confidentially, we provide no names or identifying details. We believe the research was worth any remaining risk to informants because of its important policy implications. Civil society globally is under pressure, in part due to international aid. Researchers must learn more about the local effects of international money now, so as to offer theoretically and empirically grounded insights to the NGO policy community.
Our study has methodological limitations. Safety restrictions limited our inquiry to Addis Ababa and non-probability sampling, problems minimized through maximum variation sampling within the capital (e.g., choosing informants from multiple sectors and organizational types), and by focusing on information-rich key informants. 10 We are confident that our interviews, when combined with the existing literature and with documents collected locally, offer sufficient evidence for our plausibility probe.
Findings
The Charities and Societies Proclamation has dramatically re-shaped Ethiopia's NGO sector. Briefcase and single-issue human rights groups have experienced high mortality, while INGOs and multiple-issue local NGO largely survived. For internally-focused strategies, survivors rebranded existing 8 In other words, we used a pared down version of the "reputational sampling" method advocated by Farquharson (2005) . 9 We obtained written ethics approval from the relevant university ethics board prior to fieldwork. 10 For a discussion of non-probability sampling procedures, see Patton (2001) .
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proscribed activities, including human rights, as "development" or "service provision," or restructured their portfolios to focus on less contentious and proscribed concerns. For externally focused strategies, some human rights groups successfully mobilized international allies, as we expected. Few, however, were able to mobilize substantial local political or economic support. Consequently, while international allies did their best, the transnational "boomerang" failed to change Ethiopian state policy. Dagne and Hailegebriel (2011), Rahmato, Bantirgu, and Endeshaw (2010) , and the Charities and Societies Agency (www.chsa.gov.et).
(a) Who survived?
(i) Briefcase NGOs: Eleven respondents from non-governmental and governmental agencies said that most terminated organizations were "briefcase NGOs," which first appeared in Ethiopia "because of the [earlier] NGO bonanza, when people would establish an NGO and try to get money for it, and if they did, they would set up shop."
12 This analysis is supported by the available aid data, which indicates that Ethiopia has been the largest African recipient of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) since 2007, and one of the largest since 2000. Its total ODA inflow tripled from 2000-2010, rising from $1.03 to $3.5 billion USD (OECD 2012). Much of this aid, moreover, was directed towards NGOs, as per the 2003 Cotonou Agreement 13 between the European Union, one of Ethiopia's top donors, and recipient countries, which highlighted the importance of non-state actors in development (Rahmato, Bantirgu, and Endeshaw, 2010) . It is hard to know precisely what proportion of the 45% drop can be attributed to the elimination of "briefcase NGOs". The CSA says that it examined the files of 1500 registered NGOs prior to the Proclamation, and found that only 38% had current information on file.
14 If most of the remaining groups were in fact inactive, this yields an estimated Ethiopian briefcase rate of 62%, slightly under Barr, Fafchamps, and Owen's (2005) Kampala finding of 75%.
15 Since "only" 45% of Ethiopia's NGOs actually disappeared, however, the country's real briefcase rate may have been lower than 62%. Or, conversely, some briefcase operators may be close to the regime, and therefore successfully navigated the 2010 re-registration process. More research on this count is required.
(ii) Local NGO Mortality: As expected, many local human rights NGOs expired, especially those of the single-issue type. The Proclamation had specifically targeted rights groups, among others, and as noted above, scholars find that rights groups in the global South are highly vulnerable to international aid cutoffs.
According to one civil society expert, "The biggest impact of the law has been on local, Ethiopian human rights organizations, because other types of organizations, like local development organizations, can still access foreign funding. Almost all human rights organizations [by contrast] have died out." 16 Indeed, this expert estimated that only 13 of 125 previously existing local rights groups had re-registered with the CSA as rights groups. If true, this represents a 90% decline in the Ethiopian human rights NGO sector. Those 125 pre-2010 rights groups had offered legal aid and training, monitored human rights violations and elections, carried out civic education, and generally advocated for the rights of different Ethiopian social groups. Most were established in the late 1980's or during the 1990's as part of the rights-based turn in international development aid. Some of these were single-issue NGOs, including 25 voter education NGOs that either disappeared or have completely restructured (discussed further below), as well as the surviving legal assistance and human rights monitoring NGOs. The latter include the Ethiopian Lawyers Association, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, and the Ethiopian Women Lawyer's Association. Others worked on specific issues, such as gender or children, within a rights-based framework. Ultimately, however, as representatives of two separate NGO umbrella groups confirmed, many local rights NGOs closed down because of the new law.
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Five of the eleven international donor representatives we spoke with said the Proclamation had forced them to cut funding to local rights groups, a form of "restructuring" discussed below. One explained that as a result of the new law, "donors […] now focus on service delivery," while a second said that "donors […] don't want to conflict with the government's rules."
18 A third said her agency had re-directed money from local rights groups to pro-government NGOs, 19 while a fourth said it had moved money from local rights activities to NGO capacity building.
(iii) Local NGO Survival: Local NGOs that depended on foreign aid, but that worked on non-contentious issues -such as education, health, agriculture, and general development -survived the regulatory change. Examples include Mary Joy Aid Through Development, the Organization for Child Development and Transformation (CHADET), Agri Service Ethiopia, the Rehabilitation and Development Organizations (RADO), the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the Rift Valley Children and Women Development Association, the Emmanuel Development Association, the Ethiopian Rainwater Harvesting Association, Handicap National, and many more. Unlike Ethiopia's briefcase NGOs, these groups provided bona fide services, albeit in non-controversial areas. Prior to the Proclamation, some of these NGOs had well-established reputations and were funded by international NGOs and donors, while others (such as REST and ORDA) were (and remain) government-aligned and foreign-funded.
(b) Internally-focused survival strategies
Most surviving NGOs engaged in some kind of internal change to accommodate the Proclamation's new regulations. A survey of 32 NGOs conducted in 2011 by the donor-funded Taskforce for Enabling Environment for Civil Society in Ethiopia found that 70% of development organizations and 44% of human rights organizations covered by the study had changed their organizational vision and mission in response to the Proclamation.
20 This is not surprising, given that so few NGOs re-registered as Type 1 NGOs, "Ethiopian charities". The human rights organizations included in the survey reported they had heavily reduced their staff, scaled down activities, restructured their organizations, merged with other groups, or split their NGO into different components (Dagne and Hailegebriel, 2011) . 21 Seventeen NGOs had changed their organizational mandate from human rights to development, and 35% of human rights NGO respondents pursued both rebranding and restructuring.
As expected, most INGOs successfully re-registered with the official CSA, although often at substantial cost. For instance, two INGO representatives said their organizations had felt obliged to cut funding to local groups who refused to drop their rights-based activities; essentially, these INGOs engaged 20 The CSO Taskforce is housed at the CCRDA and is partially funded by the Donor Assistance Group for Ethiopia (DAG). This survey was designed to assess the implementation of the Proclamation and its impact on the work of civil society organizations in Ethiopia. Questionnaires were distributed to 70 organizations, which included a broad range of NGOs as well as government organizations, media, donors, and UN agencies. 32 of the 70 solicited organizations responded to the survey. 21 Not all NGOs have been forced to completely abandon their rights-based work, as there are two exceptions in the Proclamation for foreign funding of rights-based work. First, the bilateral clause in Article 3 of the Proclamation allows international and foreign organizations to enter into bilateral agreements with the government in order to continue activities that NGOs are otherwise not permitted to engage in with foreign funding. Prison Fellowship International (a pro-government NGO that works in prisons to promote human rights) and the National Coalition of Women Against HIV/AIDS (a local NGO that the former First Lady, Azeb Mesfin, chairs) are two of the very few organizations that have received a bilateral exemption. Second, there are some exceptions for rights-based work within the structure of donor funding, in that money allocated to the multi-donor Democratic Institutions Program (DIP) as well as funding from the European Commission's Civil Society Fund can be used for rights work. Under the DIP program, donor funding has been channeled to the government's Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, which then provides funds to local NGOs. The European Commission Civil Society Fund (CSF) is a joint initiative with the Government of Ethiopia, and money from the CSF is considered to be local funding by the government. (Information based on the websites of these funding entities and from interviews conducted with civil society experts and foreign donors in Addis Ababa in August 2011.) in a dramatic form of organizational restructuring. 22 In other, less painful cases, INGOs and their partners engaged in a less onerous form of collective rebranding, a process made easier by their multi-issue portfolios. As one INGO representative explained, his group and local partners simply removed "rights" from their re-registration application, and continued to work on health-related issues as before. 23 Indeed, whenever possible, surviving international and local NGOs pursued this low-cost rebranding strategy. At times, this involved a discursive shift to the older "needs-based" approach to development, emphasizing service provision and gap filling. Several interviewees said this shift had little impact on actual activities, however, suggesting either that the "rights" to "needs" change was semantic, or that the rights-based approach had never been fully implemented (CCRDA, 2011b; Abebe, 2010) . Or, as some skeptics of the rights-based approach have argued, this lack of real change suggests that the rights-based development paradigm itself is less meaningful in practice than in theory (Kindornay, Ron and Carpenter 2012) .
One local NGO worker explained why rebranding was a relatively low cost strategy for his group. "We revised our strategy, mission, and programs to a needs-based approach with a focus on protection, and moved away from a rights-based approach. Now, we talk about why education is important, but we don't talk about rights. Our activities are largely the same after the law. It is only the language that is changed." 24 A second local NGO representative said his groups changed from working on "rights" to focusing on service delivery, development, and capacity building for other NGOs and government departments (see also CCRDA, 2011b). "We changed the wording of our rightsbased activities into protection, service delivery, and development activities," a representative told us.
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Many INGOs also rebranded their work in response to the Proclamation, getting rid of their human rights rhetoric. 26 For example, the pre-2010 mission of Action Aid Ethiopia -the local embodiment of Action Aid International -was entitled "Rights to End Poverty," a mission that entailed working "with poor and excluded people, women and girls to eradicate absolute poverty, inequality and denial of rights. " In January 2010, however, the group changed its mission to working "to ensure that poor people effectively participate and make decisions in the eradication of their own poverty and their well-being generally" (quoted in Abebe, 2010 and in Action Aid Ethiopia, 2010) . Like other groups, the local Action Aid office had simply jettisoned the word "rights," effectively dissolving the rights-development rhetorical merger created just a few years earlier. The real impact of this change, however, was small.
Another INGO representative explained how his group rebranded its gender work. "We can no longer talk about equality because it is a sensitive issue. So, for example, we now talk about gender and development, not about gender equality. Otherwise, our activities in our gender program are much the same and we work on the same issues, such as gender-based violence and female genital mutilation."
27 Yet another INGO working on "child rights" explained how it had re-labeled its work as "child protection, support and education." Donors, similarly, changed their activity descriptions from "rights" to "protection", "support", "education", "empowerment", "capacity building", and "development".
28 "Rights", and a plethora of related terms, were discarded, often with little apparent real world impact.
For most Ethiopian groups, the decision to rebrand was not hard. As one civil society expert explained, "most local NGOs decided to register as resident charities and societies [Type 2 NGOs], because otherwise there would be little [foreign] funding. NGOs adapted their programs to fit within the law, and simply removed rights and governance from their activities." 29 Indeed, several interviewees said rebranding occurred after consultations with the government as to what issues they could still work on, given their use of international funding. Given the paucity of local funding, local groups felt they had little choice; as one local NGO worker put it, "NGOs must change to reflect changes in what donors fund, because we are implementers for the donors; most NGOs satisfy the needs and interest of donors".
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Some NGOs went the extra mile with their compliance efforts, eschewing rebranding in favor of the much deeper and more costly organizational restructuring. Initiative Africa, for example, had worked on good governance issues prior to the Proclamation. After the law's 2010 implementation, however, the group switched its mission to "Education For All." Action Professionals Association for the People (APAP), similarly, changed to providing socio-economic services for the poor, developing the capacity of other NGOs, and carrying out research. The Ethiopian Arbitration and Conciliation Center stopped providing conflict resolution and arbitration activities, and now provides capacity building and judicial training. The Hundee Oromo Grassroots Organization, which had a portfolio of rightsfocused activities, now works on livelihoods, land rehabilitation, food security, environmental rehabilitation, and women's empowerment. Another prominent human rights organization, the African Initiative for a Democratic World Order (AIDWO), previously engaged in human rights advocacy and civic and voter education, restructured quite dramatically by renaming itself Amadeaes and working on entirely new issues. Following the 2010 change, this NGO works for the inclusion and development of women and girls as well as on environmental protection. Voter education organizations also shifted to new activities, including leadership training and other activities. 31 In fact, the Ethiopian Civil Society Network for Elections, which consisted of 24 members, no longer exists. Additionally, nearly all of the members of the Union of Ethiopian Civil Society Organizations, formerly an umbrella organization consisting of 25 service delivery, development, advocacy and human rights organizations, changed their mandates from rights work, and now operate in entirely new issue areas. In these cases, restructuring was both feasible and, apparently, successful, at least in terms of NGO survival.
Another prominent restructuring example is the Organization for Social Justice Ethiopia (OSJE), a local NGO that had previously worked on human rights, social justice, voter education, and election monitoring. Today, the group calls itself the Organization for Social Development, and works on corporate social responsibility. 32 As one informant from an umbrella NGO said, the "OSJE was told by the Charities and Societies Agency [CSA] that they could not stay with their mission unless they were an Ethiopian charity [Type 1 NGO]. But the OSJE could not raise sufficient funds [locally], so they changed their name and mission" (see also Amnesty International, 2012b).
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The OSJE became the OSD, the mission changed, but the foreign-sourced revenue continued.
As expected, many NGO survivors said that the Proclamation hadn't killed their groups off because their multi-issue portfolios spread across both proscribed and non-proscribed areas. For example, many of the organizations listed in Table 2 , as well as seven of the nine local and international NGOs we interviewed, successfully rebranded or restructured because they were not single-issue human rights groups. These multi-issue survivors enjoyed established reputations in non-proscribed fields, and could therefore continue to work on those issues without the "rights" label. Single issue rights groups, by contrast, "found it hard to switch to a new issue area," one informant explained, both because they "lack[ed] the skills and expertise," and because "they don't have many established [foreign] donors."
34 With no track record in non-controversial issue areas, few single-issue groups can quickly gain the necessary expertise and reputation to attract donor money and successfully restructure. (IV) Externally-focused survival strategies: The government's ban on international aid to local rights groups triggered little local protest. As one source explained, "the rights-based approach [to development] was not well known among the public. In the past, civil society organizations were engaged in service delivery, and only more recently have they combined rights, advocacy, and service delivery. The public and NGO beneficiaries are not upset about the removal of the rights-based approach since they don't really know what it means." 35 As a report on the Proclamation's effects explained, many local NGOs in Ethiopia had been created to reflect donor rather than local priorities, instilling in the public a view of NGOs as foreign, rather than indigenous, organizations:
Most Ethiopian CSOs are set up by a few individuals and rely on foreign funds. Their relations with the communities they work with have been hierarchical (donor-recipient) rather than one of equal partnership. Lack of constituency/mass base has undermined the bargaining power of CSOs and risks resulting in alienation from the public. Hence, the public didn't stand in their support when they faced policy and legal challenges, and they become easy prey for defamatory media campaigns on the sector (CCRDA 2011a, 65-66).
Transnational support for Ethiopian rights groups, by contrast, was much higher. From mid-2008, when the government published the Proclamation's first draft, to January 2009, when the final draft was approved, local NGOs successfully lobbied a wide variety of transnational actors for "boomerang" style support. Among other steps, they established a Task Force under the direction of the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA), Ethiopia's largest umbrella NGO, to protest the Proclamation and serve as a conduit between Ethiopian civil society and the international community (Hailegebriel, 2010; CCRDA, 2011b) . Understandably, many of these efforts were low profile, as NGOs feared triggering more government scrutiny and retaliation. 36 As one donor representative explained, "NGOs want to stay alive, and it's hard to expect them to pressure the government. There was little courage to confront the government once the law came out, since there is a history of civil society representatives being imprisoned and harassed."
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In reality, transnational advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, along with the international media and some Western governments, didn't need much prompting to protest the Proclamation. "Local groups didn't need to intensely lobby international groups," one informant explained, "because the international groups were so on top of 
FIGURE 1
Source: Compiled through online searches by Kendra Dupuy in August 2012. Includes all the reports, press releases, and commentaries specifically written about Ethiopia that were published by these two organizations.
Respondents also said foreign donors privately pressured the government prior to the Proclamation's passage, and urged retraction after it became law (Hailegebriel, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2010) . To that end, the 26 donor members of the Ethiopia Development Assistance Group (DAG) established a civil society task force to analyze the Proclamation and negotiate with the government.
40 Barring a few minor changes, however, these efforts did not succeed, the reasons for which we discuss below (CCRDA, 2011b) .
Conclusions
Ethiopia is a prime example of the ongoing global backlash against civil society, wherein states restrict the advocacy work of local and international NGOs in their country, especially those funded by foreign donors and focusing on human rights, political equality, elections, democratization, justice, and conflict resolution. In responding to this backlash, moreover, local NGOs have enjoyed greater success in mobilizing transnational rather than local support. In some cases, local citizens are justifiably afraid to help local NGOs, cognizant of the state's repressive power and watchful gaze. In other cases, however, potential local supporters may have been turned off by local NGOs reputation as foreign-supported implants, rather than popular local citizen groups.
States rarely use new legal restrictions to entirely eradicate the NGO sector. Instead, they are keen to eat their cake and have it too, hoping to gain access to the foreign money and services that NGOs important while blocking the accompanying penetration of international scrutiny, liberal advocacy, and symbolic loss of authority. Restricting human rights advocacy work by Ethiopian NGOs, one informant explained, is "a way to limit channels of foreign influence on political work in the country. It prevents people from voting for the political opposition and guarantees the government's electoral invulnerability."
41 Or, as the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself explained, These foreign charities and societies are not allowed to engage in political activities as of right. This is normal practice in most countries, as political activities, by their very nature, are reserved for citizens. It is a sovereign state's right to limit the influence of foreigners through any financing of political activities. Aside from politics, foreign charities and societies are free to operate and assist in any much-needed development activities and humanitarian needs of the country.
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When faced with the Proclamation, most Ethiopian and international NGOs responded with "rebranding," the least costly form of compliance, or with "restructuring," a more profound organizational change. Not all local human rights groups did this, however; a brave few tried to continue their work by registering as Type 1 "Ethiopian associations," using new budgets composed almost entirely of locally-sourced revenue and volunteers. Examples include the Ethiopian Women Lawyer's Association (EWLA), the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRC), the Ethiopian Human Rights & Civic Education Promotion Association, and Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy. These groups eschewed rebranding or restructuring, most likely because of their long history of human rights work, and their directors' strong normative commitments to social and political change through human rights ideas and tools. As one source noted about the surviving human rights groups, "they didn't want to compromise their mission because they know their contribution was high, and they are committed to their work." Or, as the director of Vision Ethiopian explained in a newspaper interview, "Most [Ethiopian] advocacy groups changed their status and transformed themselves into development associations. You can ask us why we didn't do so. For me it is an insult to deviate from once established objectives and activities which we were engaged in for over 15 years."
43 These rare NGOs paid a high price for their commitment, however. Both the EHRC and EWLA were forced to dramatically downsize, with the former closing nine of its twelve offices and slashing its staff from 60 persons to 9, and the latter making similarly drastic cuts (Amnesty International, 2012a & 2012b .
Why, then, was local political and financial support so hard to mobilize for Ethiopian NGOs? Clearly, one major reason is the state's repressive behavior and crackdown on political dissent, human rights work, and related activities. In the wake of the 2005 elections, the government made it clear that local human rights NGOs would be targeted with greater scrutiny, restrictions, and repression, and potential local donors are likely to have been scared off by these threats. This is especially true given the Proclamation's ban on anonymous giving. As one source noted, "people are afraid to contribute to NGOs because of the association of NGOs with opposition politics due to what happened during the 2005 elections. The level of trust in donating money to organizations has declined." 44 At the same time, our interviews also suggest that the human rights discourse may not deeply rooted in Ethiopia, and that is also likely to be one explanation for local groups' inability to raise both local resources and to mobilize mass political protest. Claim of this sort were made by some of our sources, cited above, as well as by scholars studying human rights NGOs elsewhere in Africa. 45 In Ethiopia, the overall number of human rights groups is comparatively small, and the rights-based approach to development is relatively new. As a result of these and other factors, popular awareness of the potential utility of "rights talk," as opposed to development or service delivery, is likely low. Though most states worldwide have signed international human rights instruments, the general public's interest in, or 43 www.thereporterethiopia.com/Interview/it-is-rather-commendable-to-every-citizen-to-come-out-and-confrontany-difficulty.html. 44 Interview A14, Addis Ababa, August 2011. 45 An-Na'im2000; Dicklitch and Lwanga 2003; Englund 2006; Mutua1994, 1997 Okafor 2006; Odinkalu 1999;  even their awareness of, those principles varies from country to country. Thus, while Latin America has enjoyed a long history of human rights-based support at both elite and popular levels, the same is not true of other world regions, including Africa (Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2013).
The resonance of human rights ideas aside, local human rights NGOs often lack the skill, networks, and personnel to successfully mobilize resources from their co-citizens, local philanthropies, and domestic businesses. In Ethiopia, as in many other countries in the global South, the ready availability of preProclamation foreign aid has given human rights NGOs little incentive to acquire the tools necessary to raise local resources.
Popular reluctance to give money to human rights groups is also likely linked to a broader disinterest in giving to the NGO sector overall. "There is no culture of fundraising or institutional giving in Ethiopia," one local NGO representative lamented. "It is really foreigners and people with a 'foreign culture' who give money to NGOs." 46 Instead, most Ethiopians perceive NGOs' role as one of giving money to Ethiopians, rather than the reverse (CCRDA, 2011b) . Some Ethiopians are mistrustful of NGOs, fearing that they are unaccountable, corrupt, or focused on personal gain. As one former local NGO employee noted, "The law revealed that working in an NGO is all about money. NGOs didn't seek out local sources of funding but rather changed their objectives to fit the law and keep operating. NGOs are a lucrative business: they provide allowances, high salaries, and travel opportunities. NGOs can engage in patronage, by giving out jobs or workshops in return for money and other forms of support. NGOs want to keep money flowing because of the benefits."
47 Or as one INGO source argued, "many people [in Ethiopia] view NGOs as being wasteful, that they do nothing and simply earn big salaries." 48 These criticisms echo the most critical of arguments advanced by scholarly skeptics and Ethiopian government officials, and are likely driven by the briefcase NGO phenomenon discussed above.
Survey data suggests that Ethiopians are unwilling to contribute in large numbers to charitable organizations. According to a 2012 Gallup study, only 9% of surveyed Ethiopians answered "yes" when asked whether they had "donated money to a charity" in the last month, compared to 28% in Kenya, or 16% in Sudan. 49 Yet as a comprehensive report on charity in the global South argues, "in every country there exists a culturally specific concept 50 and term for what we call philanthropy," and in every country, money is both donated to, and often by, the poor (Dulaney and Winder, 2001 ). According to our informants, Ethiopians donate small amounts to religious institutions, the poor, family members, and community associations, perceiving this aid as more concrete and useful than money donated to organized charities, or formal rights advocacy groups. After all, the same Gallup poll also found that 44% of surveyed Ethiopians reported having "helped a stranger" during the past month. The charitable impulse is thus alive and well in Ethiopia, but it is typically expressed in ways not conducive to local NGO fund raising. Some 82% of surveyed Muslim Ethiopians in 2008-09, for example, reported giving alms (zakat) to the needy, one of the five pillars of Islam. These and other local charitable contributions are typically channeled through religious figures and institutions, however, rather than through the formal, modern-style organizations that are NGOs.
Finally, our paper raises questions about why and how the Ethiopian government successfully resisted transnational NGO advocacy. One reason for this lies in international and Northern donor priorities; according to our sources, many donors feared that cutting foreign aid to Ethiopia "would leave people hungry" and undermine the country's progress towards food security and other development goals. 51 As one informant explained, "Donors like the government's emphasis on development," and Ethiopia's economic performance "mollifies [the donors'] disappointment over democratic performance."
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More importantly, perhaps, Ethiopia has proved a stable U.S. and Western ally in an unstable area. Ethiopia for example, has played a key role in the "Global War on Terror"; its forces invaded Somalia with US support in 2006, and the government has since allowed US drones to use southern Ethiopia as a base. As one respondent noted, "there is a quid pro quo arrangement between Ethiopia and the West. Ethiopia ensures that Western military objectives are met in exchange for little pressure regarding domestic politics." 53 This arrangement is supported by the U.S. policy of "quiet diplomacy," which involves American unwillingness to publicly criticize Ethiopian abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2010) , and an increase in U.S. aid to the country a year after the Proclamation. Future research should investigate such issues in greater detail, especially for countries that have sought to restrict NGOs, but are not directly involved in America's ongoing military, political and diplomatic strategy.
In conclusion, while we have provided some evidence regarding the effect of a regulatory change on the Ethiopian NGO sector and the NGO survival strategies, this exploratory study is based on limited data and provides only preliminary support for our hypotheses. Further investigation is required to verify that the empirical patterns that we have observed are, in fact, those experienced by the NGO sectors of other countries that have also experienced a regulatory change. However, evidence from other countries where restrictive NGO laws have been implemented -such as Egypt, Eritrea, and Russia -show that these laws directly shaped organizational survival as well as the issue areas on which NGOs work, giving a preliminary indication that similar outcomes prevail in other contexts. We also interviewed three high-ranking individuals from two different, locally prominent NGO consortiums, whose representatives were then in a position to comment on the Proclamation's effects. To this, we added two local academics, one foreign academic, and one independent civil society expert engaged in analyzing the Proclamation's effects, as well as three INGOs operating outside the country, but whose staff were knowledgeable about the Proclamation. We interviewed eleven representatives from seven major international donors and offices associated with, or supported by, these donors. All worked with Ethiopian civil society issues and organizations, and had detailed knowledge of the Proclamation's effects. We also spoke with three international advocacy organizations located outside of Ethiopia that had been involved in transnational campaigns to reject the law. Finally, we interviewed two individuals from the government's Charities and Societies Agency, the entity responsible for implementing the new laws. 
